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OPINION* 
   
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
 Innovators have long recognized that “[m]any ideas grow better when transplanted 
into another mind than in the one where they sprang up.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., The 
Breakfast Table Series: The Poet at the Breakfast Table 146 (1900). So the law encourages 
collaboration and rewards authors of a joint work with the benefits of joint ownership. Peter 
Brownstein seeks a declaration of joint ownership in a computer program he developed 
with Tina Lindsay and an accounting of profits. The District Court granted summary 
judgment to Lindsay and her company, Ethnic Technologies (“E-Tech”), seeing no proof 
of Brownstein’s role. We will affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND  
In 1993, Lindsay began compiling a set of rules in order to “predict” a person’s 
ethnicity. Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 2014). She knew the concept 
had value given her employment at List Services Direct, Inc., a direct-marketing company 
that sold customer lists. Id. at 58–59. So she enlisted Brownstein, a fellow List Services 
employee, to transform her rules into a computer program. Id. at 59. Lindsay’s rules were 
known as the Ethnic Determinate System (“EDS”), and Brownstein’s computer code was 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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called “ETHN.” Id. Together, EDS and ETHN became the Lindsay Cultural Identification 
Determinate (“LCID”). Id. 
In 1996, List Services asserted ownership of the LCID, prompting Lindsay and 
Brownstein to leave the company in June 1997. Id. at 60. List Services, Lindsay, and 
Brownstein later signed a Settlement Agreement in which Lindsay and Brownstein 
“agree[d] not to claim ownership or any other rights” to “a certain computer program 
concerning ethnic selections” that List Services was “presently using,” and List Services 
“disclaim[ed] any ownership to EDS.” (App. at 317–18.) Years later, things soured 
between Lindsay and Brownstein, and they parted ways. Brownstein, 742 F.3d at 61. 
In 2010, Brownstein filed this lawsuit, seeking a declaration that he is co-owner of 
the LCID and an accounting of any profits Lindsay and E-Tech earned from the program 
after May 2010. Id. at 61–62. The case proceeded to trial and, at the close of Brownstein’s 
evidence, the District Court granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants. The 
District Court held that Brownstein’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and, 
in any event, that Brownstein lacked evidence showing his co-authorship of the LCID. Id. 
at 62–63. We reversed on appeal, holding that the accrual date of Brownstein’s claims was 
a jury question. Id. at 69–75. And we relied on an oral argument concession by defendants’ 
counsel “that Brownstein and Lindsay were co-authors of the LCID up until its 1997 
iteration” to remand for further factual development of the co-authorship issue.1 Id. at 65, 
77. 
 
1 We also reversed an order by the District Court that cancelled certain copyright 
registrations. Brownstein, 742 F.3d at 58, 63, 77. That issue is not relevant to this appeal. 
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 On remand, Brownstein filed an amended complaint, which Lindsay and E-Tech 
then moved to dismiss. After converting that motion into a motion for summary judgment, 
the District Court held that the Settlement Agreement extinguished Lindsay and 
Brownstein’s rights to all pre-Settlement-Agreement versions of the LCID. (App. at 26.) 
The District Court then described the “operative question” as whether post-Settlement-
Agreement versions of the LCID “continued to use [Brownstein]’s computer code.” (App. 
at 26.) Although Brownstein submitted an affidavit describing his work on the LCID, and 
copies of text purporting to be relevant computer code, the District Court rejected the 
affidavit as “conclusory” and the code as “not self-evident.” (App. at 29.) For those 
reasons, the court found that Brownstein failed to sustain his burden of production, and 
again granted summary judgment to the defendants. This timely appeal followed.2 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 Brownstein raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the District Court 
erroneously interpreted the Settlement Agreement as “sever[ing]” or “deconstruct[ing]” the 
LCID, (Opening Br. at 28–29), in contravention of established copyright principles, and 
that defendants’ continued use of Lindsay’s rules, by itself, entitles him to compensation.    
It is true that “[t]he authors of a joint work are co[-]owners of copyright in the 
work,” 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), and that each joint author acquires “an undivided ownership in 
the entire work, including all the contributions contained therein.” Nimmer on Copyright 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338, and 1367. We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and again exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment. Brownstein, 742 F.3d at 64.  
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§ 6.03 (2019); see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more 
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or 
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” (emphasis added)). But as we previously noted, 
the EDS was an “independent work,” of which Lindsay was the “sole author.” Brownstein, 
742 F.3d at 59. And merely using the EDS in the LCID did not affect Lindsay’s ownership 
of her rules, nor give Brownstein any rights in them. Cf. Greene v. Ablon, 794 F.3d 133, 
153 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting that a work “may be both joint and derivative, with [the original 
work’s author] owning the copyright in the underlying work . . . and co-owning the 
copyright in the derivative work”). So the District Court did not split the joint-work atom; 
instead, it correctly interpreted the Settlement Agreement as abrogating both parties’ 
interest in the LCID. And it was not improperly depriving Brownstein of any rights in the 
EDS, since he had none to begin with. 
Second, Brownstein argues that the Settlement Agreement did not transfer any 
copyrights, but merely evidenced the parties’ decision to “waive[] any rights of 
enforcement they might have had” against the other. (Opening Br. at 43.) But this argument 
ignores language in the Settlement Agreement acknowledging that List Services and its 
executives were the “sole owner(s)” of “a certain computer program concerning ethnic 
selections” that List Services was “presently using.” (App. at 317–18) (emphasis added). 
Lindsay and Brownstein weren’t agreeing to cooperatively share the pre-Settlement-
Agreement LCID with List Services; they were recognizing they no longer “owne[d]” any 
of it, including its copyrights. 
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Third, and finally, Brownstein argues that the District Court ignored evidence of his 
post-Settlement-Agreement authorship contribution to the LCID. We need not address this 
issue, since even if Brownstein co-authored some post-Settlement-Agreement version of 
the LCID, he has failed to demonstrate that Lindsay and E-Tech profited from that version, 
or a derivative thereof, in May 2010 or afterward. His complaint concedes that any code 
he authored was “phased out” of defendants’ programs long ago. (App. at 231.) As noted 
above, he never had any rights in the EDS itself, so continued use of those rules entitles 
him to nothing. And he does not otherwise explain, or offer evidence to show, how 
defendants’ post-May-2010 product was derivative of any earlier one. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 As we noted in our previous opinion, Brownstein could prevail only if he 
demonstrated that defendants profited either from a work he jointly authored, or from a 
derivative. Brownstein, 742 F.3d at 67–68. Because he has done neither, his claims fail. 
We will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. 
